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NOTES & COMMENTS 
The Unlikely Duo That Shocked the  
Intellectual Property World and Why the 
Supreme Court Was the Chosen One to 
Restore Balance 
NICHOLAS DILTS*  
The United States Congress passed the Leahy Smith 
America Invents Act in 2011 in an effort to streamline the 
patent system and reduce patent litigation, allowing the 
United States to continue to be competitive globally. The Act 
enabled the U.S. Patent Office to facilitate patent challenges 
through an administrative process called inter partes re-
view, an adversarial proceeding before the newly estab-
lished Patent Trial and Appeal Board that was designed to 
be a cheaper and more efficient alternative for post-grant 
patent review than litigation in front of the federal district 
courts. In the years that followed, the Patent Trail and Ap-
peal Board has earned a reputation for being notoriously 
trigger-happy in its invalidation of patents. This reputation 
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has encouraged patent holders to seek out ways to circum-
vent inter partes review in an effort to have their patents re-
viewed in front of the federal district courts, where they 
might stand a better chance. One such attempt was initiated 
by the global pharmaceutical company, Allergan, Inc., when 
it sold the rights to its Restasis eye drug to the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe. The main components of the deal focused on 
a transfer of the Restasis ownership rights along with a 
yearly sum to the Tribe. In return, the Tribe licensed back 
the drug’s production rights to Allergan and agreed to assert 
a tribal sovereign immunity defense in response to any inter 
partes review challenge, which would force the dispute into 
the federal district court forum.  
The Allergan-Saint Regis deal threatened to have major 
impacts on the intellectual property world, the livelihoods of 
the federally recognized tribes, and the U.S. economy over-
all. The issues it presented involved an intersection of multi-
ple types of law and begged a review of the patent review 
process, the state of the tribes today, and the scope of tribal 
sovereign immunity in today’s day and age. Whether tribal 
sovereign immunity could be applied to an administrative 
action in post-grant patent review evolved into a battle at 
multiple forums. When the dust settled, the Patent Trial and 
Review Board had issued a decision that tribal sovereign im-
munity was not applicable and invalidated the Restasis pa-
tent—a decision that was affirmed by the United States 
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United 
States. This Comment discusses all of the angles in this case 
before advocating that the Supreme Court ultimately did not 
go far enough when it simply chose not to review the lower 
court’s decision. Instead, the Court should have used this 
opportunity to limit tribal sovereign immunity in a way that 
implies a waiver of sovereign immunity for economic activi-
ties that take place off of tribal lands. This solution would 
simultaneously help to promote overall systemic and eco-
nomic efficiency, as well as allow the tribes a better oppor-
tunity to participate in today’s marketplaces—providing 
them with a more positive outlook for the future.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2017, the pharmaceutical company Allergan, a 
leader in the industry, announced a deal that transferred the patent 
rights to one of their most valuable drugs, Restasis, to the Saint 
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Regis Mohawk Tribe.1 Under the major terms of the deal, Allergan 
transferred the patent rights and $13.75 million to the Tribe, who 
agreed to grant an exclusive license of those same rights back to 
Allergan for $15 million a year in royalty payments throughout the 
patent’s lifespan.2 While this transaction looked like a very bad busi-
ness deal on its face, the move created instant buzz within the legal 
community because of its potential impact on the future of the intel-
lectual property world, the rest of the federally recognized tribes, 
and virtually all consumers within the United States.3 So, why did 
Allergan choose to partner with a Native American tribe and why 
has the move garnered such attention? Because Allergan, with the 
assistance of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, was in pursuit of a ma-
jor pharmaceutical company’s Holy Grail—immunity from review 
by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s patent review process.4  
Prior to the deal, the validity of Allergan’s patent rights to their 
Restasis eye drugs had been challenged by several generic compet-
itors looking to market their own, cheaper version of the drug.5 Nor-
mally, the U.S. Patent Office facilitates such challenges through an 
administrative process called inter partes review (“IPR”) that entails 
an adversarial proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB” or “Board”) rather than litigation before the federal district 
courts of the United States.6 While the IPR process was designed to 
be a cheaper and more efficient alternative for reviewing the validity 
of patents, it has drawn the ire of drug companies like Allergan that 
often find themselves before the Board as defendants.7 This is due 
to the companies’ shared belief that presenting their patents for re-
view in front of the Board is the intellectual property world’s equiv-
alent of sending their patent to the gallows.8 However, unlike its 
                                                                                                         
 1  Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native Ameri-
can Tribe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/ 
health/allergan-patent-tribe.html.  
 2  Id.  
 3  Id. 
 4  Id.  
 5  Id.  
 6  Joe Mullin, Apple Is Being Sued for Patent Infringement by a Native Amer-
ican Tribe, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2017, 8:11 AM), https://arstech-
nica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/apple-is-being-sued-for-patent-infringement-by-a-
native-american-tribe/.  
 7  Id.  
 8  See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
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predecessors that lost their patents following a PTAB review, Aller-
gan strategically crafted a plan to bypass the Board’s review, which 
began when the company ceded ownership of the Restasis patent to 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.  
As the new owners, Saint Regis asserted a tribal sovereign im-
munity defense in front of the PTAB in an effort to shield the patent 
from the Board’s review.9 If such a defense were allowed, the PTAB 
would have been left without the jurisdiction required to render a 
decision on the patent’s validity.10 For Allergan, the deal would have 
enabled the company to defend their patent in a more agreeable fo-
rum—the federal district courts. For the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe 
and the rest of the Native American tribes within the United States, 
the move provided a potential revenue stream and accompanying 
opportunities for a community that is in deep need.11 For the rest of 
us, the ramifications of this deal and the extent of its potential effect 
on the U.S. economy were incalculable. The battle over Restasis 
evolved into one fought on multiple fronts, both in front of the 
PTAB and the federal courts.12  In February of 2018, the PTAB ren-
dered a decision against Saint Regis’s use of the tribal sovereign 
immunity defense, saying that it did not apply in this case.13 The 
Tribe appealed that decision, which was affirmed by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.14 Allergan and the 
Tribe petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a review 
of the decision, but the Court denied their writ of certiorari, affirm-
ing the lower court’s decision and putting an end to the case.15  
                                                                                                         
 9  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Pa-
per 130, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018); Thomas, supra note 1; Jason Rantanen, 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Allergan v. Mylan: No Tribal Immunity for IPR, PA-
TENTLY-O (July 23, 2018) https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/07/mohawk-aller-
gan-immunity.html. 
 10  Thomas, supra note 1. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Rantanen, supra note 9.  
 13  Id.  
 14  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); Rantanen, supra note 9. 
 15  Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Allergan Bid to Use Tribe 
to Shield Drug Patents, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-usa-court-allergan/us-supreme-court-rejects-allergan-bid-to-
use-tribe-to-shield-drug-patents-idUSKCN1RR1FD.  
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The issue of whether tribal immunity from suit can be applied to 
an administrative action in patent review begs a review of the scope 
of tribal immunity, the effectiveness of the IPR process, and consid-
eration of the impact a decision for either side will have going for-
ward. This Comment argues that the correct course of action in this 
situation was to not only invalidate the Allergan-Saint Regis deal, 
but also amend the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as a 
whole—a task that could have been accomplished by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Part I provides background information 
on IPR, tribal sovereign immunity, and the state of the tribes today 
in an effort to better understand the Allergan-Saint Regis deal. Part 
II analyzes the major issues posed by the Allergan-Saint Regis case 
and why the PTAB should not have ruled on the matter. Finally, Part 
III argues that the Supreme Court should have invalidated the deal 
and, in doing so, amended the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
to imply a waiver of its protections for tribal commercial activities 
that occur off of the reservation.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A dive into the intricate and complex matters surrounding this 
issue warrants an overview of the background and legal positions 
that shaped the driving factors behind the Allergan-Saint Regis 
deal—current patent law, tribal sovereign immunity, and the state of 
Native American tribes in our country today.  
A. Patent Law and IPR 
The Constitution of the United States grants the federal govern-
ment the power to create and issue patents.16 The owner of a patent 
can prevent all others from making, selling, or using their invention 
in the United States throughout the patent’s lifespan, which is gen-
erally twenty years from the date the inventor filed his or her patent 
application.17 The limits that define the areas protected by a patent 
are described in the patent’s claims.18 In order to obtain a patent, an 
                                                                                                         
 16  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 17  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).   
 18  How Do I Read a Patent? - the Claims, BROWN & MICHAELS, 
http://www.bpmlegal.com/howtopat5.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).  
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applicant must prove that their invention is both novel19 and nonob-
vious, meaning that the difference between the prior art and the 
claimed invention would not be obvious to a “person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”20 From 
a policy standpoint, the U.S. patent system is functioning at its most 
optimal level when there is a balance between patent holders and 
market competition.21 Allowing patent holders to have a monopoly 
over their invention for the duration of their patent incentivizes re-
search and development that likely would not occur absent such pro-
tections, and thus, promotes innovation.22 On the other side of the 
scale, “[c]ompetition stimulates innovation by fulfilling consumers’ 
unmet needs or providing them new, better services.”23 
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy Smith America Invents Act 
(“AIA”), establishing the PTAB.24 The AIA gave the PTAB the abil-
ity to hold trials to challenge the validity of patents through several 
new post-grant proceedings, including the IPR.25 Congress’s pur-
pose when it created the IPR was to present a method for challenging 
the validity of a patent that was a faster, cheaper alternative to liti-
gation in the district courts.26 To accomplish this goal, IPRs were 
designed as an adjudicative model (instead of examinational) that 
includes restricted discovery, statutory time limits, litigation time 
limits, and one level of appeal.27 Additionally, the post-grant review 
of patents better enables the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
                                                                                                         
 19  35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(2).  
 20  Id. § 103.   
 21  Stephanie A. Diehl, Treating the Disease: A First Amendment Remedy for 
the Problem of Patent Trolls and Overbroad Business Methods, 33 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 495, 499 (2015).   
 22  Id.  
 23  Id.  
 24  Kenneth J. Costa, Patent System Manipulation: Hedge Funds Abusing IPR, 
Poor Patent Quality & Pharmaceutical Monopolies, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 177, 182 (2016).   
 25  Id.  
 26  Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Very Few Appreciated Just How Bad AIA Inter 
Partes Reviews (IPRs) Would Be for Patent Owners, Although IPR Denials Have 
Been, for Patent Owners, a Glimmer of Hope, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 28, 31 
(2015). 
 27  Id. at 32–33.  
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(“PTO”) to weed out invalid or poor-quality patents while strength-
ening and validating the good patents that emerge from review un-
scathed.28  
Early returns on the IPR process have sparked controversy and 
earned the PTAB a nickname, the “Death Squad,” for its role in in-
validating numerous existing patents.29 Kenneth Costa presented 
several statistics that show just how beneficial the IPR process has 
been for petitioners:  
In its first year of IPR, the PTAB granted 87% of pe-
titions, and in its second year, it granted 76% of pe-
titions. The overall claim cancellation rate, as of 
March 2014, was 96.4%. Thirty months into the cre-
ation of IPR, the overall claim cancellation rate was 
80.9%.30  
Numbers like these encourage generic drug companies and other 
third parties to challenge name-brand pharmaceutical corporations 
in front of the Board. In the eyes of many, pharmaceutical compa-
nies allegedly obtained these bad patents through abuse or manipu-
lation of the patent approval process, part of a multitude of tactics 
employed by big pharma that allow the companies to artificially in-
crease drug prices and keep competitors out of the market.31 
On the other hand, numbers such as these encouraged patent 
holders to advocate that IPR is unfairly skewed to favor petitioners 
and unnecessary because an avenue to challenge patents already ex-
ists at the federal courts.32 Opponents of this viewpoint argue that 
IPRs are fundamentally different from district court proceedings in 
                                                                                                         
 28  157 CONG. REC. S1380 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grass-
ley).  
 29  Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially 
Viable Patents Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-in-
valid/id=48642/.  
 30  Costa, supra note 24, at 183.   
 31  Id. at 184–86 (discussing pharmaceutical companies’ ability to extend their 
patents through simple changes to the dosage, packaging, or slightly reformulat-
ing the drug to produce a “new” version and describing “pay-for-delay” schemes 
that pay generic drug companies to keep their generic version out of the market 
or buy a start-up rival).  
 32  Thomas, supra note 1.  
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ways that are favorable to the petitioners.33 The main differences are 
identified as the “Big 3”: (1) the PTAB applies a “broadest reason-
able interpretation” claim construction,34 while district courts use 
the “ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by a 
person of ordinary skill in the art” framework developed in Phillips 
v. AWH Co.;35 (2) the PTAB grants no presumption of validity for 
issued patent claims unlike the district court; and (3) the PTAB only 
requires a showing of unpatentability by preponderance of the evi-
dence, which is a lower standard than the “clear and convincing ev-
idence” standard used by the district courts.36 Additionally, the 
PTAB is not bound by other administrative proceedings or judicial 
decisions, which means that an owner of a patent that a district court 
ruled was valid can later find themselves defending their patent’s 
validity again in an IPR proceeding.37  
With the deck stacked against them in IPR, patent holders cer-
tainly have an incentive to force any fight over the validity of their 
patents into the federal district courts where a patent’s chances to 
survive are more favorable. Brent Saunders, the CEO of Allergan, 
explained that the motivation behind the deal with the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe was “to avoid what he described as the ‘double jeop-
ardy’ of having the same issue heard in two venues.”38 In fact, the 
legal theory behind the Allergan-Saint Regis deal and the parties’ 
attempt to block the PTAB’s ability to review the Restasis patent via 
employment of the tribal sovereign immunity defense was moti-
vated by recent PTAB decisions to dismiss cases based on the vic-
torious party’s state sovereignty protections prescribed to them un-
der the Eleventh Amendment.39  
                                                                                                         
 33  See Lewis & Irving, supra note 26, at 58–59.  
 34   Id. 
 35  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
 36  Lewis & Irving, supra note 26, at 58–59.   
 37  Id. at 60–61; see Katharine L. Neville, PTAB Not Always Bound by Previ-
ous Court Decisions Regarding Patent Validity, MARSHALL GERSTEIN IP: 
PTABWATCH (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.ptabwatch.com/2017/12/ptab-not-al-
ways-bound-by-previous-court-decisions-regarding-patent-validity/ (explaining 
that it is legally permissible for the PTAB to arrive at different conclusions re-
garding patentability than an earlier court decision on the same patent due to dif-
fering standards of review and/or additional evidence presented).  
 38  Thomas, supra note 1.  
 39  See id.  
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B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Exploring the history of tribal sovereign immunity helps answer 
the complex questions posed by the Allergan-Saint Regis deal and 
presents the justification for the Supreme Court’s authority to alter 
the doctrine. The first and only mention of the Native American 
tribes within the United States Constitution lies within the Indian 
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to regulate 
commerce with the tribes.40 In the past, courts consistently inter-
preted this as a grant to Congress of plenary and exclusive authority 
to legislate in regard to tribal affairs.41 This reading is supported by 
the repeatedly relied upon characterization of Indian tribes as “do-
mestic dependent nations”42 whose title as sovereigns stems from 
their status as self-governing nations that pre-existed the United 
States and its Constitution.43 However, unlike state sovereign im-
munity from suit, which is codified in the Eleventh Amendment,44 
the Supreme Court independently created tribal immunity from suit 
as federal common law in United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company when it held that “Indian Nations are exempt from suit 
without congressional authorization.”45 The purpose of this immun-
ity was grounded in “history” and the principle of comity, defined 
as a “proper respect for tribal sovereignty,” that encourages harmo-
nious relations between the United States and tribal governments.46  
The federal courts’ freedom to create common law can only be 
prescribed through an explicit or implicit grant from the Constitu-
tion or Congress.47 While neither the Constitution nor Congress 
have explicitly regulated tribal sovereign immunity, Thomas P. 
McLish asserted that an implicit analysis of both led to the notion 
that the policies embodied within statutes Congress has passed that 
related to tribal affairs must serve as the basis for the federal court’s 
                                                                                                         
 40  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 41  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).  
 42  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).  
 43  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).  
 44  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.   
 45  309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).  
 46  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (So-
tomayor, J., concurring).  
 47  Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 883, 895–96 (1986).  
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extension of tribal immunity from suit.48 An examination of those 
statutes yielded McLish’s conclusion that the current congressional 
policy “seeks to encourage tribal cultural autonomy, self-determina-
tion and economic security.”49 These policies present a framework 
for identifying the scope of tribal immunity that will be used in this 
Comment to assess the Allergan-Saint Regis deal.  
Another useful guide for evaluating tribal sovereign immunity is 
past jurisprudence on the doctrine. In the past, courts accepted that 
any intent to abrogate tribal immunity must be unequivocally ex-
pressed by Congress.50 Outside of that, only a clear waiver of sov-
ereign immunity by a tribe would suffice and that waiver may not 
be implied.51 The Supreme Court has emphasized stare decisis as 
controlling and that, outside of congressional action, any departure 
from the doctrine would demand “special justification.”52 This rea-
soning has stood despite recent limitations on the overall doctrine of 
tribal sovereignty and a trend toward eliminating the other common 
law immunities from suit.53 Lately, the Court has declined to make 
an exception for commercial activities, even those occurring off 
tribal reservations, in the face of contentions that tribal business ven-
tures have become so detached from tribal interests that immunity 
no longer makes sense in the commercial context.54 Throughout 
                                                                                                         
 48  See Thomas P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible 
Limits, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 181–89 (1988).  
 49  Id. at 184–89.  
 50  See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (“Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign 
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”).  
 51  Id.  
 52  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014).  
 53  See, e.g., In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058, 
1064–68 (1982) (describing several recent court decisions concerning assertions 
of tribal power over nonmembers and State taxation of tribal businesses located 
on the reservation as evidence of a narrowing of tribal sovereignty).  
 54  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–56 
(1998) (tribe entitled to immunity from suit on promissory note regardless of 
whether it was signed on or off the reservation); Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2034 
(“[A] State lacks the ability to sue a tribe for illegal gaming when that activity 
occurs off the reservation.”); Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511 (tribal convenience 
store operating on land not formally designated as “on reservation” exempt from 
state cigarette tax); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Dep’t of Game of the State of Wash., 
433 U.S. 165, 170–73 (1977) (state could not exercise jurisdiction over Tribe to 
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these decisions, the Court has held that even in their own view of 
the merits, the courts will “defer to the role Congress may wish to 
exercise in this important judgment.”55  
Despite this apparent steadfastness, judicial support for the doc-
trine of tribal immunity has begun to waiver. In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. 
v. Department of Game of Washington, Justice Blackmun stated in 
his concurring opinion that the doctrine “may well merit re-exami-
nation in an appropriate case.”56 Additionally, in Kiowa Tribe of Ok-
lahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the majority opinion 
acknowledged the merits behind “doubt[ing] the wisdom of perpet-
uating the doctrine.”57 In the recently decided Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Community, tribal sovereign immunity narrowly emerged 
unscathed after four justices voted to curb the doctrine.58 As a part 
of that decision, Justice Thomas wrote a powerful dissent that advo-
cated for Kiowa’s overruling on the basis that the policy rationales 
for the immunity doctrine and deference to Congress do not apply 
to Kiowa’s “unjustifiable rule and its mounting consequences.”59 
Thomas’s reasoning in his dissent helped form the basis of this 
Comment’s ultimate resolution in Part III that the Court should have 
amended tribal sovereign immunity to alleviate the problems the 
doctrine now poses for modern society. 
C. Native American Tribes Today 
Any discussion of tribal sovereign immunity and the Allergan-
Saint Regis deal should consider the current economic position of 
Native American tribes in the United States today. In light of the 
congressional policy to promote tribal economic self-sufficiency, 
“tribal business operations are critical . . . because such enterprises 
in some cases ‘may be the only means by which a tribe can raise 
revenues.’”60 On its face, the economy of American Indian tribes 
seems to be doing well, especially in the gambling industry where 
                                                                                                         
assess penalties related to regulation of their fishing activities on or off the reser-
vation).  
 55  Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.  
 56  Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 178–179 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (entertaining 
doubts of the doctrine’s “continuing vitality”).  
 57  Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.  
 58  See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2024.  
 59  Id. at 2045–56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
 60  Id. at 2043 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
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gaming revenues have increased from $8.5 billion in 1998 to $27.9 
billion in 2012.61 Outside of the gambling industry, tribes have en-
gaged in on-reservation commercial activities like “tourism, recrea-
tion, mining, forestry and agriculture” as well as expanded off-res-
ervation to domestic and international ventures including cigarettes, 
foreign financing, national banks, cement plants, ski resorts, and ho-
tels.62  
Still, a look behind the curtain will reveal that the economic po-
sition of tribes is not what one might envision, especially when it 
comes to gaming revenue from casinos.63 Only forty-two percent 
(42%) of the federally recognized Native American tribes in the 
United States operate gambling enterprises.64 Of those facilities 
tribes are operating, twenty percent (20%) of them are raking in sev-
enty percent (70%) of the total gaming revenues.65 This casts a 
shadow over the popular idea that all American Indian tribes are lin-
ing their coffers with casino riches and reveals the darker reality—
a few tribes are profiting from gaming while many tribal govern-
ments struggle to find ways to bring in revenue for their constituents. 
These efforts have been complicated by federal laws and court de-
cisions that have served to limit tribal sovereign immunity and 
broaden government jurisdiction over tribal reservations.66 The Su-
preme Court has allowed states to impose taxes on cigarette sales to 
non-Indians,67 non-Indian businesses,68 and property owned by non-
Indians69 that are on Native American lands and normally would act 
                                                                                                         
 61  Id. at 2050 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 62  Id. at 2050–51.  
 63  See Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, WRIT-
TEN DESCRIPTION (Sept. 13, 2017, 12:42 AM), https://writtendescription.blog-
spot.com/2017/09/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-law.html (stating that, 
contrary to popular belief, “Indian gaming revenue is spread very unevenly, with 
only a handful of well-situated tribes bringing in large sums”).  
 64  Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2043 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 65  Id.  
 66  See In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 53, at 1062–68 
(describing what the author deems as “the demise of tribal immunity” based on 
legislative and judicial actions that limited tribal sovereign immunity).  
 67  See generally, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980).  
 68  See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., Inc., 526 U.S. 32, 36–39 
(1999).  
 69  See generally, Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 281–84 (1898).  
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as a revenue source for tribal governments. The effects have been 
further compounded by congressional acts such as the Dawes Act, 
which resulted in almost 150 million acres of American Indian res-
ervation lands to be owned by non-Indians in an effort to encourage 
tribal assimilation within American society.70  
As a result of these legal developments, tribal leaders face a 
tough choice—either subject individuals and businesses that choose 
to settle on reservation lands to double taxation or limit their tribe’s 
own ability to generate revenue.71 These funds could be used to as-
sist constituencies that are in desperate need because Native Amer-
icans are still feeling the effects of hundreds of years of colonializa-
tion, violence, and persecution.72 In the third quarter of 2014, the 
unemployment rate among Native Americans sat at 11%, which was 
about twice the national average of 6.2%.73 Over one in four Native 
Americans lived in poverty at the time and their labor force partici-
pation rate (a statistic that measures the percentage of adults that are 
either working or looking for a job) was 61.6%—the lowest for all 
race and minority groups.74 From an educational standpoint, 52% of 
the 14,217 Native American students that took the ACT in 2013 
failed to meet any of the college readiness benchmarks in the exam’s 
four core subjects.75  
All of these factors likely contribute to the heightened level of 
criminal activity amongst American Indian peoples identified in a 
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice between the 
years of 1992 and 2002.76 According to the study, the rate of violent 
victimization per 1,000 persons age twelve or older amongst Amer-
ican Indians was over twice the rate of any other race within the 
                                                                                                         
 70  Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2044 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 71  Ablavsky, supra note 63.  
 72  See id.  
 73  Katharine Peralta, Native Americans Left Behind in the Economic Recov-
ery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 27, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.us-
news.com/news/articles/2014/11/27/native-americans-left-behind-in-the-eco-
nomic-recovery.  
 74  Id.   
 75  Allie Bidwell, Are American Indian Students the Least Prepared for Col-
lege?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: DATA MINE (Mar. 13, 2014, 3:29 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/03/13/are-american-in-
dian-students-the-least-prepared-for-college.  
 76  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992–2002: AMERI-
CAN INDIANS AND CRIME (2004).  
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United States.77 Further, as offenders, American Indians had an ar-
rest rate for alcohol violations that was twice the national rate, were 
investigated and convicted for a higher rate of violent crimes than 
all other races, and experienced an influx of gang activity within 
Indian communities.78  
 In light of these circumstances, it is not difficult to ascertain 
why the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe and others like it, in an effort to 
overcome their economic and social disadvantages, might want to 
engage in this type of transaction with Allergan. The Saint Regis 
Tribe planned to use the revenues generated from Allergan’s royalty 
payments and potential resulting deals with other companies to in-
vest in the Tribe’s “many unmet needs.”79 Other than Allergan, the 
Tribe has taken ownership of a technology company’s patents that 
it expects will earn a significant amount of money through pursuit 
of infringement suits in federal court.80 Saint Regis’s tactic had al-
ready begun to gain traction within the tribal community, as MEC 
Resources, a company owned by the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arkikara 
Nation, (otherwise known as the Three Affiliated Tribes) became a 
plaintiff in an infringement suit against Apple for a recently pur-
chased patent that the company claims Apple’s iPad 4 infringes 
upon.81 Similar to Saint Regis, MEC Resources claimed sovereign 
immunity to avoid IPR by the U.S. Patent Office and sued Apple in 
federal court seeking royalty payments generated from the iPad’s 
sales.82 This additional action provides just a small illustration of the 
importance the PTAB and lawmakers’ responses to Allergan’s at-
tempt to house its patents within the protective confines of tribal 
sovereign immunity has on both the intellectual property world and 
the broader American economy.83 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS CASE 
This Comment analyzes the two main points of contention in the 
case against Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe today. The 
                                                                                                         
 77  Id. at 4.  
 78  Id. at 17–21.  
 79  Thomas, supra note 1.  
 80  Mullin, supra note 6.  
 81  Id.  
 82  Id.   
 83  See Thomas, supra note 1.   
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first, whether or not Saint Regis’s sovereign immunity defense can 
apply to IPR, is the threshold question that must be answered be-
cause it can bar the PTAB from taking any action concerning the 
Restasis patent. Even if it were held that tribal sovereign immunity 
from suit does apply, the Allergan-Saint Regis deal could be voided 
if a court were to hold that the deal was a sham transaction. How-
ever, this Comment asserts that, because of the potential far-reach-
ing ramifications that can result from a decision on this issue and the 
limited design of IPR, the PTAB was not the appropriate forum for 
adjudication on this matter. Instead, the Board should have refrained 
from deciding the case and deferred to the federal courts for guid-
ance. At the federal level, the courts could have issued a proper rul-
ing that would have had uniform application across the law to pre-
vent schemes of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal’s ilk in the future. 
Additionally, such a ruling would have allowed the Supreme Court 
of the United States the opportunity to address the growing problem 
created by tribal sovereign immunity’s breadth.  
A. The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Should Be Entitled to Assert a 
Sovereign Immunity Defense to the Institution of an  
IPR of Its Patent 
The Supreme Court of the United States regards Native Ameri-
can tribes’ immunity from suit as one of the core aspects of sover-
eignty that a tribe possesses.84 In the past, the Court repeatedly dis-
missed any suit against a tribe that was without either an express 
authorization from Congress or an express waiver from the tribe.85 
The Court has also declined to make any exception to this tribal im-
munity notion for suits that arise from any of a tribe’s commercial 
activities—even those that take place off of tribal lands.86 
1. THE PTAB SHOULD HAVE VIEWED THIS CASE IN THE SCOPE OF 
ITS PRIOR STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY  
DEFENSE DECISIONS AGAINST IPR 
The issues presented in this case compare to prior PTAB deci-
sions that addressed the applicability of state sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                         
 84  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).  
 85  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 
(1998).  
 86  Id. at 760.  
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defenses in IPR proceedings. As an initial aside, a distinction be-
tween state and tribal sovereign immunity includes the fact that state 
sovereign immunity from suit is codified in the Eleventh Amend-
ment and tribal sovereign immunity finds its roots in federal com-
mon law.87 While these doctrinal differences make the PTAB deci-
sions regarding state immunity non-binding, that should not dis-
prove their relevance to the issue at hand. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly characterized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent na-
tions” in its decisions because, like the States, the tribes are separate 
governments located within the country and subject to the control of 
Congress.88 In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted past arguments 
that tribal immunity from suit is in some senses more powerful than 
the States’ immunities because the Native American tribes were not 
a party to the Constitutional Convention where each state surren-
dered their immunities from state-initiated suits.89  
The Supreme Court strengthened state sovereign immunity from 
suit in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports 
Authority (FMC) when it held that the immunity’s protections ex-
tend to certain adjudicatory proceedings conducted before federal 
agencies.90 According to the Court, the central purpose of a State’s 
sovereign immunity is to give states the respect they are owed as 
joint sovereigns.91 Similarly, the comity justification was the rea-
soning the Court attributed to its development of the tribal sover-
eignty doctrine.92 Following FMC, the PTAB applied the Court’s 
holding in its decisions to dismiss challenges against state institu-
tions in IPR proceedings.93  
While Saint Regis’s use of a tribal sovereign immunity defense 
against IPR was uncharted territory for decision makers on the 
                                                                                                         
 87  See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.  
 88  See cases cited supra notes 41–43.  
 89  See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).  
 90  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).  
 91  Id. at 765 (“[T]he doctrine’s central purpose is to ‘accord the States the 
respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”). 
 92  See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 93  See generally Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. 
IPR2016-1274, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017); Neochord, Inc. v. Univ. of 
Md., No. IPR2016-208, Paper 28 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2017); Reactive Surfaces 
Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. IPR2016-1914, Paper 36 (P.T.A.B. July 13, 
2017). 
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Board, the PTAB’s past decisions in Covidien LP v. University of 
Florida Research Foundation, Inc.,94 Neochord, Inc. v. University 
of Maryland,95 and Reactive Surfaces Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Corp.96 
presented an instructive framework the Board could have used in 
deciding the case. Instead, the Board chose to differentiate between 
the two types of sovereignty when it held that tribal immunity did 
not apply to IPR.97 First, the Board referenced the Supreme Court’s 
dicta in Kiowa that “the immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not 
co-extensive with that of the States.”98 Despite Saint Regis’s at-
tempts to apply the holding of FMC to the proceeding, the Board 
found that the Tribe had not presented any federal court or Board 
precedent to suggest that FMC should be applied to assertions of 
tribal sovereign immunity in similar federal administrative proceed-
ings.99 The Board further discussed tribal sovereignty’s subjectivity 
to Congress’s plenary control and the applicability of general Acts 
of Congress—such as the Patent Act and the IPR proceedings in-
cluded within its scope—to American Indians.100  Finally, the Board 
stated that because it claimed personal jurisdiction over only the 
challenged patents and not the patent owners themselves, the Board 
was outside the reach of the protections granted by tribal sovereign 
immunity.101  
While the Board presented fair points when it explained the rea-
soning behind its decision, its logic does not exactly hold water. For 
                                                                                                         
 94  Covidien, No. IPR2016-1274, Paper 21, at 17–27 (applying FMC frame-
work and finding that, considering the nature of IPR and the Board rules and pro-
cedures governing the review process, IPR resembled civil litigation sufficiently 
enough to find that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred IPR against an uncon-
senting state).  
 95  Neochord, No. IPR2016-208, Paper 28, at 12 (finding that the University 
could raise an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense in an IPR proceeding and 
granting University’s motion to dismiss, terminating the review).  
 96  Reactive Surfaces, No. IPR2016-1914, Paper 36, at 6–11 (relying on the 
factors identified in FMC and dismissing Regents of the University of Minnesota 
from the action).  
 97  See generally Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. 
IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 11–18 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).  
 98  Id. at 9 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 
751, 756 (1998)).  
 99  Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, Paper 130, at 8.  
 100  Id. at 11.  
 101  Id. at 16–17.  
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instance, the Board could have used the same personal jurisdiction 
over patents argument as an excuse to not apply state sovereign im-
munity protections in Neochord, Covidien, or Reactive Surfaces but 
it did not. Further, the fact that there was no precedent within the 
federal courts for applying FMC to tribal immunity does not mean 
that the Board should not apply it in such circumstance, only that 
the courts had not previously considered or decided such an appli-
cation. It seems instead that the Board, in an understandable effort 
to comply with its ultimate mission to protect the public interest, 
made its decision first and then crafted the reasoning behind it later.  
2. IPR: AN ADJUDICATORY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING  
SUBJECT TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PROTECTIONS 
In the past, whether or not proceedings conducted by federal 
agencies fell under the purview of sovereign immunity depended on 
the nature of the administrative proceeding and its similarities to 
civil litigation.102 The Court has noted some of the general similari-
ties between the two:  
[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency ad-
judication contain many of the same safeguards as 
are available in the judicial process. The proceedings 
are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a 
trier of fact insulated from political influence. A 
party is entitled to present his case by oral or docu-
mentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony 
and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute 
the exclusive record for decision. The parties are en-
titled to know the findings and conclusions on all of 
the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the 
record.103 
Later, FMC was applied to a matter involving tribal sovereign 
immunity when the deciding court held that “tribes are entitled to no 
                                                                                                         
 102  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753–61 (2002) 
(comparing Federal Maritime Commission proceedings with civil litigation).   
 103  Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 (1978) (internal citations omitted). 
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less dignity than states with regard to their immunity from adminis-
trative action.”104 By this logic, if IPRs were found to be adjudica-
tory proceedings, then the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity defense would stand.  
While Congress originally presented IPR as a quicker and less 
expensive alternative to district court litigation, a closer look at 
IPRs—similar to the reviews conducted in the aforementioned line 
of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity cases—reveals 
similarities like those that prompted the Court to accept the sover-
eign immunity defense in FMC. Indeed, Congress specifically iden-
tified a shift from an examinational to an adjudicative model as the 
justification for this alternative when it created the AIA post-grant 
proceedings.105 These regulations instructed the Director of the Pa-
tent and Trademark Office to create a review process that carried 
many of the same features as civil litigation, such as discovery, pro-
tective orders, the right to an oral hearing, and sanctions for abuse 
of process or discovery.106 Like the pleadings in civil litigation pro-
ceedings, IPR proceedings are initiated when a person who is not 
the owner of the patent files a petition for a review of the validity of 
an existing patent’s claims.107 In their petition, the petitioner must 
identify the real parties in interest, the claims challenged and the 
grounds for challenging, along with all relevant documents required 
for support of their assertions and ultimately carries the burden of 
proving their assertions.108  
Like civil pleadings, the petition can be met with a preliminary 
response by the post-institution patent owner that sets reasons a re-
view should not be instituted.109 This is followed by a later response 
that can be filed after IPR has been instituted and addresses the 
claims asserted by the petitioner and the petitioner’s accompanying 
right to file a reply.110 During discovery, parties may seek a motion 
for authorization (which authorizes a party to  acquire a subpoena 
from the district court) to compel testimony or produce documents, 
                                                                                                         
 104  Great Plains Lending, LLC v. Conn. Dep’t of Banking, No. 
HHBCV156028096S, 2015 WL 9310700, at *4, (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015).  
 105  157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011).  
 106  35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012).   
 107  Id. § 311(a).   
 108  Id. §§ 312, 316(e).   
 109  Id. § 313.   
 110  37 C.F.R. §§ 42.120, 42.23 (2018).  
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which is subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.111 Like 
subpoenas, any evidence provided during the IPR is also governed 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.112 The Director appoints a three-
member panel comprised of administrative patent judges from the 
PTAB to oversee the proceeding.113 Ultimately, the PTAB issues a 
final decision on the patentability of any claim challenged by the 
petitioner.114 
Additional differences exist between an Article III proceeding 
and IPR conducted by the PTAB other than those previously identi-
fied in Part I.115 As mentioned previously, IPR involves a re-assess-
ment of the PTO’s original grant of a patent unlike the classic “suit” 
to which tribal sovereign immunity is traditionally applied.116 While 
an IPR proceeding’s parameters are defined by a private party, it is 
up to the broad discretion of the Director of the PTO whether to 
initiate the review.117 Additionally, the procedures involved in IPR 
do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No monetary or 
injunctive relief is involved in the review of the patent’s claims, just 
the validity of the patent itself.118 Further, to comport with the ulti-
mate mission of a faster alternative to district court litigation, the 
duration of the proceedings is limited to one year, with an additional 
allowance of six months for good cause.119 Discovery is also limited 
unless the parties agree to additional discovery or the PTAB grants 
a motion.120 Finally, the PTO can continue to review a patent and 
render a final decision in the event a petitioner is no longer a party 
to the review.121  
Despite IPR’s adjudicatory characteristics, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in its review of the PTAB’s decision, found these 
differences to be substantial enough to hold that tribal immunity did 
                                                                                                         
 111  Id. § 42.52; 35 U.S.C. § 24.  
 112  37 C.F.R. § 42.62.  
 113  35 U.S.C. § 6(a).   
 114  Id. § 318(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.  
 115  See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.    
 116  See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 117  See Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1371 (2018) (describing the IPR process).  
 118  See 35 U.S.C. § 318.   
 119  37 C.F.R. § 42.100.  
 120  Id. § 42.51.  
 121  35 U.S.C. § 317(a).  
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not extend to administrative agency reconsideration decisions of this 
kind.122 However, this Comment respectfully disagrees with this de-
cision and argues that the differences between an Article III pro-
ceeding and IPR do not prevent a decision maker from labeling IPR 
as an adjudication in front of an administrative tribunal. As the 
Fourth Circuit wrote and the Supreme Court echoed in FMC, where 
the proceeding “walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit” 
placing that proceeding “within the Executive Branch cannot blind 
us to the fact that the proceeding is truly an adjudication.”123 In the 
past, States have been shielded regardless of whether the petitioner 
prayed for relief in the form of monetary damages or any other kind 
of relief due to the dignity the state’s sovereign status com-
manded.124 Further, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals interest-
ingly chose not to apply FMC because it found that the agency pro-
cedures in that proceeding were much closer to civil litigation than 
those used in IPR,125 although the PTAB itself clearly did not share 
the same sentiment when it applied the FMC framework to its prior 
state immunity decisions.  
Additionally, application of the tribal sovereign immunity de-
fense comports with the Supreme Court’s use of comity as a justifi-
cation for sovereign immunity and the congressional policy to pro-
mote Native American tribe’s cultural autonomy, self-actualization, 
and economic self-sufficiency.126 Adjudication and invalidation of 
the Restasis patents would eliminate a potential line of revenue and 
societal development not just for the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, but 
for all of the tribes in the United States that could follow Saint 
Regis’s lead and make deals with other companies like Allergan. In 
respect to legal precedent, comity, and Congress, any member of the 
courts or PTAB tasked with evaluating Saint Regis’s motion should 
have found that—barring other considerations—the tribal sovereign 
immunity defense applies to IPR and subsequently shields a patent 
owned by the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe from review.  
                                                                                                         
 122  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018).  
 123  Cruise S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th 
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).   
 124  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002). 
 125  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327–29. 
 126  See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.   
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B. The Validity of the Allergan-Saint Regis Deal  
While tribal sovereign immunity should apply to an IPR pro-
ceeding, an opportunity exists for a decision maker to bypass the 
immunity issue entirely. This arises in the event that Allergan’s as-
signment of the Restasis patent rights to the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe were deemed to be a sham. If so, the decision maker could 
hold that Allergan was the true owner of the patent, dismiss the Tribe 
as a party to the proceeding, and evaluate the validity of the patent 
claims. Historically, parties have made attempts to affect the juris-
diction of the courts through assignments by name only.127 Kramer 
v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.,128 the leading case on this kind of jurisdic-
tion tampering, set forth a two-prong test that evaluates (1) whether 
there was nominal or no consideration involved in the deal; and (2) 
the interest that the assignor retained after the deal was made.129  
Later cases developed factors to consider the impropriety or col-
lusiveness of an assignment, which include the following: whether 
there were good business reasons for the assignment; whether the 
assignee had a prior interest in the item or instead coincided with the 
litigation; what was the consideration given by the assignee; 
whether the assignment was partial or complete; and was there an 
admission that the motive was to affect jurisdiction.130 Using these 
factors, an assignment can be rendered ineffective following a deci-
sion maker’s determination that the assignee was not the real party 
in interest but “a strawman [who] had no real interest in the outcome 
of the case, although a good outcome would have had some eco-
nomic value.”131  
Similarly, tribal immunity has been used as a tool in schemes to 
avoid taxation and other kinds of government interference in the 
past.132 Following those instances, judiciaries have maintained that 
                                                                                                         
 127  Attorneys Tr. v. Videotape Comput. Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 
1996).  
 128  Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). 
 129  See id. at 827–29; Haskin v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 666 F. Supp. 
349, 353–54 (D.P.R. 1987).  
 130  Attorneys Tr., 93 F. 3d at 595–96.  
 131  Id. at 598.  
 132  See generally Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (devising contract to render construction materials purchased by non-
Indian subcontractor exempt from state sales taxes); Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Fin. Services, 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (payday lending 
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federal Indian law does not authorize tribes to market their immun-
ities and exemptions to businesses that normally would take their 
activities elsewhere.133 As such, the validity of the Allergan-Saint 
Regis transaction can be properly judged following a determination 
of the “real party in interest,” which involves an examination of the 
economic substance of the deal to reveal the party that would truly 
be affected by any remedy.134    
1. ALLERGAN WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST  
IN THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS DEAL 
Evaluation of whether the Allergan-Saint Regis deal was a bona-
fide transaction begs consideration of the “real party in interest” in 
light of the Kramer sham test and its accompanying factors.135 
“[T]he fact that a patent owner has retained a right to a portion of 
the proceeds of the commercial exploitation of the patent . . . does 
not necessarily defeat what would otherwise be a transfer of all sub-
stantial rights of the patent.”136 
Allergan announced its deal to assign the rights to its Restasis 
drug patents to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe on September 8, 
2017—following the start of proceedings in federal district courts 
and the petition for IPR made by Mylan Pharmaceuticals.137 Previ-
ously, Saint Regis had no involvement in the development or com-
mercialization of the drug.138 The terms of the agreement entailed 
the Tribe’s grant of an exclusive license of the Restasis patents back 
to Allergan to practice the patents in the United States for all uses 
approved by the Food Drug Administration (“FDA”) without any 
reversionary rights on behalf of the Tribe.139 The Tribe stood to re-
ceive $13.5 million up front and $15 million in annual royalty pay-
ments from Allergan for Restasis sales over the patents’ remaining 
                                                                                                         
schemes); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980) (marketing exemption from statewide cigarette tax).  
 133  Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.  
 134  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290–92 (2017).  
 135  Id.; see supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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 139  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3–*4. 
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duration.140 Additionally, Allergan had the first right to sue for any 
infringement that relates to a generic equivalent as well as the right 
to grant any further sublicenses.141 The Tribe retained all of the other 
rights to the patent’s practice outside of the aforementioned FDA-
approved uses, including the right to use the patents for research, 
education, and other non-commercial uses as well as the first right 
to sue third parties in matters not related to Restasis bioequiva-
lents.142 
Despite assigning the patent rights to Saint Regis, Allergan re-
tained complete control over the sales of the Restasis drug—a matter 
of chief importance to the company.143 As part of that exclusive li-
censing agreement for a drug that generates sales of $1.5 billion dol-
lars a year,144 the Tribe was slated to be paid one percent (1%) of 
those earnings in royalties.145 During court proceedings, Allergan 
stated that the “consideration for the assignment of the patents to the 
Tribe was the Tribe’s promise not to waive its sovereign immunity 
with respect to IPR or other administrative action in the PTO related 
to the patents.”146 Renting immunity from the Tribe in order to con-
tinue enjoying the monopolistic protections a patent provides with-
out having to subject said patents to reconsideration of their validity 
by the PTO does not amount to a legitimate business purpose.147  
The issue presented is analogous to a prior case before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, where tribal entities were running a payday 
loan business, and the Court  observed that the formal agreements 
made between the tribes and lending entities did not hide the fact 
that the tribes retained no operational control over the businesses 
and received only a small percentage of the ventures’ profits before 
                                                                                                         
 140  Id. at *1. 
 141  See id. at *4. 
 142  Id. at *4.  
 143  Thomas, supra note 1 (“A. Robert D. Bailey, the chief legal officer of Al-
lergan, said . . . ‘It’s one of our most valuable products, so we can’t wait.’”).  
 144  Michael Erman & Tamara Mathias, Allergan Assuages Shareholder Fears 
over Losing Restasis Patent, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2017, 7:26 AM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-allergan-results/allergan-assuages-shareholder-fears-over-
losing-restasis-patent-idUSKBN1D14HV.  
 145  Thomas, supra note 1. 
 146  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2.  
 147  See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. S & N Travel, Inc., 58 F.3d 857, 862–63 
(2d Cir. 1995) (facial collusion to affect jurisdiction shifts the required burden to 
showing “a legitimate business purpose for the assignment”).   
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holding that the tribes could not assert immunity.148 Allergan’s use 
of formalities to divert attention from the transaction’s hollowness 
amounted to little more than an illusion. Once someone is able to 
move past the smoke and mirrors of the deal, it is easy to see that 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe provided no real consideration in 
making this deal and identify Allergan as the real party in interest.  
2. LEGAL PRECEDENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST CATERED  
TOWARD INVALIDATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
Transactions similar to the Allergan-Saint Regis deal have been 
historically disregarded when they run contrary to the policies un-
derlying relevant laws.149 Originally, Congress developed the patent 
system as a way to spur innovation by incentivizing research and 
development that would not normally occur absent some form of 
protection.150 IPR was later introduced as a way to re-examine an 
earlier agency decision to issue a patent that in retrospect should not 
have been issued.151 By doing so, the government can better protect 
the delicate balance between incentivizing development and creat-
ing monopolies that the patent process naturally created and com-
port with the public’s “paramount interest in seeing that patent mo-
nopolies . . . are kept within legitimate scope.”152 Allergan benefited 
from the patent system’s protections, made billions off of the Res-
tasis patent, and then sought to continue doing so without honoring 
the system’s limitations that were built in as safeguards.153 IPR 
emerged as a threat to the existence drug companies have built as 
they engaged in a system of abusive tactics aimed at manipulating 
markets, suppressing the competition, and charging higher prices to 
                                                                                                         
 148  See People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enter., 386 P.3d 357, 376–79 
(Cal. 2016).  
 149  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (comparing the circumstances sur-
rounding the Allergan-Saint Regis deal to tax shelter schemes that were labeled 
as sham transactions and disregarded when held to be against public policy).   
 150  See Costa, supra note 24, at 181.  
 151  Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).  
 152  Id.; Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) (discussing the 
importance “to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless 
patents.”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the 
Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 51 (2010) (stating that an invalid patent 
“reduces the overall value of patent protection and undermines the public’s con-
fidence in the patent system at large”).  
 153  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2.  
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the public.154 The Allergan deal received so much attention because, 
assuming its strategy to purchase “a legal loophole in the cloak of 
tribal sovereignty”155 were successful, the company would have pro-
vided a blueprint for patent owners across all industries to under-
mine the entire patent system and, subsequently, the American mar-
kets.156 Prior instances like this have inspired the Court to state that 
public welfare demands the PTO to not sit idly by in the face of 
wrongly issued patents and deceptive tactics.157 
While the federal courts have traditionally looked to congres-
sional policies that promote the tribes and emphasized respect of 
tribal sovereignty, they have also been keen to prevent the tribes’ 
abuse of those protections in an effort to “alter the economic reality 
of a transaction . . . to reap a windfall at the public’s expense.”158 
Following the decisions made in regard to tribal proliferation of pay-
day lending and tax evasion schemes, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals made a very clear statement: tribes do not have a “legiti-
mate interest in selling an opportunity to evade the law” to non-In-
dians.159 In fact, this case is very similar to Washington v. Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, which went before 
the Supreme Court.160 There, the Court approved Washington’s ap-
plication of a statewide cigarette tax to the tribe’s on-reservation 
cigarette sales to non-Indians, stating that the principles behind Na-
tive American law did not “authorize Indian tribes thus to market an 
exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do 
their business elsewhere.”161 Like in Colville, although the result of 
invalidation of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal eliminates the poten-
tial for tribal commerce with other companies looking to shield their 
                                                                                                         
 154  See Costa, supra note 24, at 184–91.  
 155  Otoe-Missouria Tribe v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Services, 769 F.3d 105, 
114 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 156  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *2.  
 157  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) 
(explaining that a wrongly issued patent does not solely concern those private 
parties but “[t]he public welfare demands that the agencies of the public justice 
be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of decep-
tion and fraud”).  
 158  Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1190 (2017).   
 159  Otoe-Missouria, 769 F.3d at 114–116.   
 160  Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134 (1980). 
 161  Id. at 155. 
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patents, the market for these types of assignments only existed in the 
first place because of Saint Regis’s claimed exemption of immun-
ity.162  
3. WEIGHT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCORDED TO SAINT REGIS’S  
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS CLAIMS AND ITS INTEREST AS AN  
INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
Although the FDA-approved sales of Restasis are the main part 
of the patent’s worth to Allergan, that does not preclude the Tribe 
from showing the substantiality of the rights they retained after 
granting the exclusive-license in the Restasis patents to Allergan. If 
the Tribe could show that it retained substantial rights in those pa-
tents, Saint Regis would then be a necessary party to the action and 
thus, the validity of any PTAB decision made concerning the valid-
ity of the Restasis patent or Allergan-Saint Regis deal with only Al-
lergan present would be subject to challenge.163 Aside from the roy-
alties stemming from the exclusive license, it was argued at the 
Texas district court that Saint Regis’s retained right to sue third par-
ties not related to Restasis bioequivalents and the right to practice 
the Restasis patents for research, education, and other non-commer-
cial uses were substantial, prompting a decision by the court to join 
Saint Regis as a plaintiff.164 This sentiment was not echoed by the 
PTAB, which dismissed Saint Regis from the action under the rea-
soning that Allergan had at least an identical, if not increased, inter-
est in defending the validity of the Restasis patent.165 This Comment 
argues that decision was a mistake.  
Unquestionably, tribal governments have been placed in a posi-
tion where they must undertake innovative methods to generate rev-
                                                                                                         
 162  See id. at 157.  
 163  See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 
2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).  
 164  Id. at *4 (adopting the “safer course of joining the Tribe as a co-plaintiff, 
while leaving the question of the validity of the assignment to be decided in the 
IPR proceedings”).  
 165  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Pa-
per 130, at 37–39 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).  
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enue in order to serve their constituents and improve their commu-
nities.166 For the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Allergan deal 
alone—and the yearly royalties it offered—provided a substantial 
boost to their annual budget of $50 million.167 In addition to Aller-
gan, the Tribe hired a firm to vet patents from other companies and 
refer them to the Tribe along with recommendations for potential 
business uses.168 While the Tribe planned to use those patents in in-
fringement litigation at the federal courthouse, it also opened an Of-
fice of Technology, Research and Patents whose purpose is to en-
courage research and development in the fields of science and tech-
nology.169 Further, the Office hopes to foster education of Mohawk 
children in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math 
in an effort to create revenue, jobs, and new economic development 
opportunities.170 This lends credence to the notion that the rights re-
tained by the Tribe in the Allergan deal were not empty. The Tribe 
would have had no need for the Office if its purpose was to sit idly 
by and cash the Restasis royalty checks it receives from Allergan. 
Instead, the Tribe viewed this line of business as a way to truly help 
its people. This is primarily why—after examination and considera-
tion of all the relevant documents—the judge at the district court 
considered the question of whether Saint Regis had retained any 
substantial patent rights to be a close one.171  
Further, importance can also be assigned to the accepted premise 
that the Tribe is an indispensable party in any proceeding that will 
evaluate their contractual agreement with Allergan.172 Courts have 
previously held that a “[t]ribe’s interests in its status, its sovereignty, 
                                                                                                         
 166  See supra Section I.C.; Ablavsky, supra note 63 (“Tribal leaders are un-
derstandably anxious to make deals that will bring much-needed jobs and money 
to places that have long lacked both.”).   
 167  Thomas, supra note 1.  
 168  Id.   
 169  SRMT Office of Technology, Research and Patents Information, SAINT 
REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/OTRAP-
Website-Blurb.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).  
 170  Id.   
 171  Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 
WL 4619790, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).   
 172  Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) (“No pro-
cedural principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an 
action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the 
determination of the action are indispensable.”). 
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its beneficial interests in real property, and its contractual interests 
cannot be adjudicated without its formal presence.”173 Like the prej-
udiced tribe in Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, the Saint Regis Tribe had 
significant property interests at stake in its rights to ownership of the 
patents and subsequent royalty streams from the license agreement 
with Allergan, as well as its ability as a sovereign to enter into valid 
contracts.174  
Further, it is unlikely that Allergan was able to adequately cap-
ture the interests of the Saint Regis Tribe in any adjudication over 
the validity of the contract and the substantiality of the patent rights 
the Tribe retained post-license. As a company, Allergan’s main ob-
ligations are to its shareholders. On the other hand, the Tribe is 
uniquely responsible for the best interests of its Native American 
citizens and furthering its economic development in order to benefit 
its community. As such, the Tribe’s ability to represent itself in these 
proceedings touched the congressional policy interests of cultural 
autonomy, self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency.175 In 
light of these considerations, it would have been reasonable for a 
decision maker to come to the conclusion that the Tribe would be 
prejudiced if a final judgment on the Restasis patent and the validity 
of the Allergan-Saint Regis agreement was rendered without the 
Tribe’s presence at an adjudication to which it consented to be a 
party.  
C. The PTAB Should Have Issued a Stay and  
Deferred to the Federal Courts for Guidance 
The PTAB chose to bypass rendering a decision on the validity 
of the Allergan-Saint Regis transactions when it held both that the 
Tribe was not entitled to assert its immunities at their proceedings 
and that it was not an indispensable party. Instead, it arrived at that 
decision by differentiating tribal sovereign immunity from that of 
                                                                                                         
 173  Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1049 (E.D. Cal. 
2016); 25 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012) (“Indian tribes retain the right to enter into con-
tracts and agreements to trade freely.”).  
 174  Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326–27 (holding that Tribe’s royalties under a 
lease and the impact the lease’s cancellation would have on the community were 
sufficient to support a finding of prejudice and indispensability). 
 175  Enter Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 894 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (“The Tribe’s interest [is] in its sovereign right not to have its legal 
duties judicially determined without consent.”).  
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the states, emphasizing the existence of their jurisdiction over pa-
tents themselves, and holding that under the deal’s terms Allergan 
remained the effective owner of the Restasis patent so the proceed-
ings could continue absent participation of the Tribe.176 However, 
after consideration of the circumstances, an alternate decision to stay 
proceedings at the PTO and allow the case to play out in the federal 
courts was the best course of action for all of the stakeholders that 
stand to be affected by this issue.  
Adjudicating issues that either have potential to or affirmatively 
do involve tribal sovereignty submerge the Board in an evaluative 
inquiry of tribal motivations and the policies that surround the idea 
of tribal economic development.177 This is an arena that requires 
vastly different expertise than what is required to evaluate those pa-
tent challenges based on prior art and obviousness over which Board 
members have been granted statutory jurisdiction.178 In light of this, 
the potential of the Board’s decision to inappropriately affect Native 
American sovereignty—a complex doctrine that has received heavy 
congressional and judicial attention—and the ripple effects that de-
cision may produce should have encouraged the PTAB to tread with 
caution.179  
Procedurally, the design of IPR restricts the Board’s ability to 
properly decide on this issue. To start, the compressed time sched-
ule180 and limited discovery afforded to parties181 in IPR may be ef-
ficient for review of patent validity disputes between two parties, 
but this issue merits a full inquiry and discovery process that would 
                                                                                                         
 176  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, Pa-
per 130 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).  
 177  See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 178  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 103 (2012). 
 179  See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (absent explicit author-
ization from Congress, decisions of “great constitutional import and effect” are 
outside an administrator’s decision-making authority); see also King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (holding that the Internal Revenue Service was not 
equipped to address questions that involved profound “economic and political sig-
nificance” stemming from the Affordable Care Act).  
 180  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2018).  
 181  Id. § 42.51 (covering mandatory disclosures, routine discovery and pro-
duction of additional documents); id. § 42.52 (discussing procedure for compel-
ling testimony and production).  
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likely stretch the time-pressed PTAB thin. Any decision on this mo-
mentous issue carries the potential of far-reaching ramifications and 
therefore, anything less than a complete factual determination may 
prejudice all parties involved. Additionally, the decision reached by 
the PTAB on the Allergan-Saint Regis deal is not likely to be bind-
ing, given that the PTO rarely labels opinions as precedential for all 
other future patent validity reviews in front of the PTAB.182 Uniform 
and consistent action by the PTO in regard to tribal patent assign-
ments and immunity defenses is required to avoid serial assertions 
and challenges to sovereign immunity that themselves could under-
mine the patent validity review process.183  
The PTAB decision on a matter of this much importance was 
hasty given the fact there were actions pending in other forums that 
could drastically impact both IPR and tribal sovereign immunity. 
Shortly after the announcement of the Allergan-Saint Regis deal, 
Senator Claire McCaskill introduced a bill that would abrogate In-
dian Tribes’ ability to assert a sovereign immunity defense in IPR.184 
Any mention of State sovereign immunity assertions is noticeably 
absent from the bill, meaning its passage is unlikely because it 
would do little to eliminate the threat of assertions of sovereign im-
munity at the PTAB and carries with it the opportunity for Native 
Americans to assert that they have been discriminated against.185 
Still, the bill shows that lawmakers on Capitol Hill are cognizant of 
the matter and serves as an indicator that Congress—the preeminent 
authority on Indian affairs—is considering abrogation of tribal sov-
ereign immunity.  
                                                                                                         
 182  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Ap-
peal Board, PATENTLYO (May 10, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016 
/05/precedent-process-patent.html (discussing the designation of five opinions as 
precedential in 2016 and the rarity of the designation since only three had been 
given the label in the prior twenty-two months).   
 183  See Mullin, supra note 6 (describing how the Allergan-Saint Regis strategy 
of transferring patents to Native American tribes could result in a reshaping of the 
intellectual property landscape as patent holders would transfer their whole patent 
portfolios to tribes).  
 184  S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 185  Gene Quinn, Senator McCaskill Introduces Bill to Abrogate Native Amer-
ican Sovereign Immunity, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.ipwatch-
dog.com/2017/10/05/senator-mccaskill-legislation-abrogate-native-american-
sovereign-immunity/id=88975/.  
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Additionally, the constitutionality of the entire patent review 
process was recently argued in front of the Supreme Court186 in what 
became one of two landmark patent decisions issued by the Court in 
2018.187 A prospective lame-duck PTAB issuing a decision on the 
Allergan-Saint Regis patent rights is contrary to public interest and 
carries the potential of being the final nail in PTAB’s coffin, since 
any perception by the Court that the Board overstepped its authority 
could tip the scales and result in PTAB’s invalidation. In 2018, Al-
lergan initiated an infringement action in the Eastern District of 
Texas against the generic drug companies.188 At the conclusion of 
the proceedings, the Court joined the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe as 
a co-plaintiff but left the question as to the assignment’s validity to 
be decided in the IPR proceedings where it had already been pre-
sented.189  
In light of all of the aforementioned factors, the clear, best course 
of action by decision makers on the Board was to stay the inter partes 
proceedings and allow for the issues that precede any validity as-
sessment of the Restasis patents to be adjudicated by the federal dis-
trict court. In doing so, the PTAB would have simultaneously com-
ported with judicial precedent190 and been released from the burden 
of potentially abrogating a Tribe’s sovereign immunity absent au-
thority. A case at the federal court level represented the best chance 
to render a correct decision following an opportunity to compile a 
complete factual record and develop legal reasoning that compre-
hend the multitude of factors at play. It also presented an opportunity 
                                                                                                         
 186  Jeff John Roberts, The Supreme Court’s Blockbuster Patent Case: What 
You Need to Know, FORTUNE (Nov. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/27/su-
preme-court-patents/.  
 187  Renee C. Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Supreme Court Issues Much Antici-
pated Oil States and SAS Decisions, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 24, 2018), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/24/supreme-court-issues-much-antici-
pated-oil-states-sas-decisions/id=96302/. 
 188  Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 
WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).   
 189  Id. at *4.  
 190  Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008) (“A case 
may not proceed when a required-entity sovereign is not amenable to 
suit. . . . [W]here sovereign immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign 
are not frivolous, dismissal of the action must be ordered where there is a potential 
for injury to the interests of the absent sovereign.”). 
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for the courts to properly address the growing issue of overbroad 
tribal immunity protections.  
These decisions would establish precedent for other courts and 
administrative decision makers, like the PTAB, to use when facing 
this issue in the future. Indeed, the PTAB did just that when it used 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in FMC to guide its subsequent deci-
sions concerning the applicability of state sovereign immunity to its 
own IPR proceedings.191 Instead, the Board eschewed these broader 
implications when it made a decision that viewed the Allergan-Saint 
Regis issue through the narrow scope of applicability to its own pro-
ceedings.  
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO AMEND THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
This Comment argues that the PTAB erred when it chose to 
make its decision on the applicability of tribal immunity to IPR pro-
ceedings and Saint Regis’s dispensability as a party—a close call in 
its own right and one that does not address the issue of tribal sover-
eign immunity’s overbroad protections. True, the decision was ap-
pealed and affirmed at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, but the court also chose not to address the larger tribal sov-
ereign immunity issues in the case and restricted the scope of its 
review to the Board’s decision and reasoning.192 The Allergan-Saint 
Regis deal itself—specifically, the threats it posed on the federal pa-
tent system and U.S. markets—indicates that the doctrine of tribal 
immunity has grown to levels that are inconsistent with the congres-
sional policies that underlie it.  
Ideally, Congress would address this issue as Congress pos-
sesses the power to intervene and legislate over common law. Un-
fortunately, Congress has failed to take an official stance on the mat-
ter. As such, the responsibility for amending tribal sovereignty falls 
on the Supreme Court. The federal courts’ standard for reviewing 
administrative agency decisions of this kind requires the decisions 
be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”193 In the past, this has 
                                                                                                         
 191  See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 192  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2018).  
 193  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
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occurred following a court’s finding that the agency failed to con-
sider a relevant and important factor in making its decision.194 This 
would seemingly provide an avenue for the Court to consider the 
larger impacts that the Allergan-Saint Regis deal would potentially 
have on American Indian communities and the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity as a whole, if the Court elected to do so. 
As Justice Thomas detailed in his Bay Mills dissenting opinion, 
the doctrine of tribal immunity was a common law creation of the 
Supreme Court and the Court bears the fault for failing to properly 
define the immunity’s scope.195 Until Congress does so, “it is up to 
[the Supreme Court] to correct [its] errors.”196 On the basis of stare 
decisis, when prior decisions have become unworkable or time has 
exposed their shortcomings, the public interest demands that prece-
dent be overruled.197 In Kiowa, the Supreme Court extended the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity to bar suits arising from tribal 
commercial activities that occurred off of the tribal reservation.198 
While the Court narrowly reaffirmed the Kiowa decision on the 
grounds of comity, stare decisis, and deference to Congress’s ple-
nary power over the tribes in Bay Mills, Justice Kagan left the door 
open for a change when she said a special justification would be 
needed to “overcome all these reasons for this Court to stand pat.”199  
Allergan and Saint Regis had expressed that they were working 
on a petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court for a ruling on the 
matter.200 Saint Regis’s use of tribal immunity in an attempt to create 
a loophole in the U.S. patent system that would pose a threat to the 
U.S. economy seems to satisfy that “special justification” require-
ment and, if so, provided the perfect opportunity for the Court to 
                                                                                                         
 194  Dep’t of State v. Coombs, 482 F.3d 577, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
 195  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2049–50 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 196  Id.; see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (“[I]f, in 
the absence of legislation, judicially derived standards leave the door open to out-
lier punitive-damage awards, it is hard to see how the judiciary can wash its hands 
of a problem it created, simply by calling quantified standards legislative.”).  
 197  Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2051.  
 198  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758, 760 
(1998).  
 199  Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2036 (majority opinion).  
 200  Dani Kass, Allergan, St. Regis Drop 2 Short-Lived Restasis IP Suits, LAW 
360 (Jan. 3, 2019, 8:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1115088/allergan-
st-regis-drop-2-short-lived-restasis-ip-suits.  
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accept the petition in order revisit the Kiowa line of cases. Instead, 
the Court opted for the easy way out when it denied Allergan and 
Saint Regis’s petition and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s ruling—a 
move that succeeded at striking the Allergan-Saint Regis deal but 
avoided ruling on the stickier issue of the scope of tribal sovereign 
immunity.201  
Rather than absolute immunity from suit that can only be waived 
by Congress or a tribes’ explicit consent, the Court should have 
amended the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to imply a waiver 
of a tribe’s immunity in commercial activities that take place off of 
the reservation. This would not have changed the ultimate outcome 
of the PTAB’s decision. Alternatively, while the application of the 
PTAB decision is limited only to IPR proceedings, this hypothetical 
solution fashioned by the Supreme Court would have created a prec-
edent that could be uniformly applied by other courts and adminis-
trative agencies around the country.  
Further, the implied waiver would have been able to comport 
with the congressional policy behind tribal sovereign immunity—
encouragement of tribal cultural autonomy, self-determination, and 
economic security. A slight abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity 
in this fashion would not threaten the tribes’ cultural activities be-
cause it only relates to business and could actually serve to foster 
tribal economic development. Additional evidence of an implied 
waiver’s alignment with Congress’s intent can be found in the In-
dian Reorganization Act.202 There, Congress allowed tribes to bifur-
cate into governmental entities and corporate entities, thus creating 
two distinct legal entities.203 As Thomas McLish explained, this al-
lowed for tribal corporations to waive immunity in order to better 
participate in normal business activities while still protecting the 
tribal government from suit.204 McLish continued to explain that this 
indicates that Congress “did not intend all commercial activity by 
the tribes to be immune” and that tribal governments choosing to not 
use the Act’s corporate provisions or to act independently from that 
                                                                                                         
 201  Hurley, supra note 15.  
 202  Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2012).  
 203  Id. at §§ 476–477. 
 204  McLish, supra note 48, at 189–90 (explaining that despite the legislation, 
Courts have continued to recognize immunity where the tribal governments 
“acted commercially through a subordinate economic enterprise.”).  
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tribal corporation to engage in commercial activities “should not be 
immune from suits arising from their commercial dealings.”205 This 
makes sense given the potential windfall a blanket immunity from 
suit presents for tribes and any associated business partners such as 
Saint Regis and Allergan.  
A decision to imply such a waiver would have served to alleviate 
any potential market inefficiencies unintentionally created as a re-
sult of the continued proliferation of Native American commercial 
activity.206 An implied waiver of immunity from suit for off-reser-
vation commercial activities would enable tribal businesses to com-
pete effectively in today’s markets, as businesses or lenders that 
were previously reluctant to commercially engage in business with 
the tribes due to their sovereign immunity would no longer have to 
worry.207 Today, the expansion of tribal commercial activities and 
the associated disputes that have occurred as a result seem to indi-
cate some sort of sensible tribal immunity waiver that can both serve 
the best interests of the tribes and promote market efficiency.   
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court originally fashioned tribal sovereign im-
munity as federal common law with the best of intentions. As the 
years have passed and the world has changed, the Court’s deference 
to Congress and stare decisis have allowed the doctrine’s breadth to 
grow past the sensibility of the policies that underlie it to a point 
where the public interest is threatened. The PTAB was unfit to 
properly review the sovereign immunity issue that the deal between 
Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe presents because, at 
best, the Board’s invalidation of the deal serves as only a Band-Aid 
solution. As Congress has failed to properly address the matter, the 
Supreme Court should have exercised the power it possesses to 
amend tribal sovereignty and imply a waiver of immunity from suit 
for a tribe’s commercial activities that occur off of tribal lands. This 
                                                                                                         
 205  Id.   
 206  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2051 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (illustrating how tribal immunity hampers State’s ability 
to protect their own citizens and enforce their laws against tribal businesses).   
 207  McLish, supra note 48, at 189.  
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would have represented an equitable solution for all stakeholders in-
volved and thus, would have restored balance to the intellectual 
property world and the public at large.  
